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MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: THE NEED
FOR AN EXPANDED CHAPTER IX
New York City's default crisis in 1975 presented to Congress and
the nation the possibility of a major municipality's entering the
federal bankruptcy court. 1 Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, as
recently amended by Congress,2 provides the exclusive remedy by
which local governmental units 3 may obtain relief from burdensome indebtedness. Unlike certain other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, Chapter IX is limited to a voluntary composition or
extension of indebtedness. 4 In recent years municipalities have
developed complex systems of financing, while experiencing unprecedented expansion in the services which they must provide.
Accordingly, a mere composition of municipal indebtedness is no
longer adequate, because a composition can only reduce the debt
or postpone the default. In order to solve the problems which
precipitate a particular financial crisis, a complete reorganization
of municipal finances may be necessary. 5 However, under Chapter
IX bankruptcy courts are not empowered to effectuate such a
comprehensive reorganization as a part of the relief available
through a municipal bankruptcy proc;eeding. 6 This article will

1
In addition to New-York ·ciiy, man·y· other cities are finding it increasingly difficult to
provide existing levels of services while maintaining a balanced budget. Tax bases are
shrinking at the same time that demands for.wages, fringe benefits, pensions and goods are
spiraling. City Financial Emergencies: The Intergovernmental Dimension, REP. No. A-42,
ADVISORY COMMIS_SION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 31 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Financial Emergencies].
2
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (to be codified as 11 U .S.C. §§
401-418) (1976).
3
The current Chapter IX lists a wide variety of government units including towns,
counties, improvement districts, school districts and incorporated authorities. Bankruptcy
Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 81, 90 Stat. 315 (to be codifed as 11 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) ).
Although this article focuses upon the needs of cities or towns, the arguments are equally
applicable to all types of local governmental units. This article will use the terms city,
municipality and petitioner interchangeably to describe the petitioning governmental entity.
• 5 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, ,i 81.27 (4th ed. 1975). A composition is an agreement
between a debtor and his creditors where the latter agree to accept less than the whole
amount of their claims. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 357 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). An agreement on
the part of a debtor to pay his debts in full but with a postponed maturity date is termed an
extension. Id. at 694.
5
See Financial Emergencies, supra note I, at 85-86.
6
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. 94-260, § 83, 90 Stat. 316 (to be co~ified as 11 U .S.C. §
403, ·(1976)), limits the power of the court: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall be
construed to limit or impair the power of any State to control, by legislation or otherwise,
any municipality or any political subdivision of or in such State in the exercise of its political
or governmental powers, including expenditure therefore .... " See also Bankruptcy Act,
ch. 9, Pub. L. 94-260, § 82(c), 90 Stat. 316 ~to be codified as II U.S.C. § 402(c) (1976)).
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explore the desirability of granting more comprehensive powers to
bankruptcy courts and will consider the constitutional authority for
such an expansion of Chapter IX. It will also advance specific
suggestions for this modification of Chapter IX.

I. THE HISTORY OF CHAPTER IX

The basic premise of the law of municipal corporations is that a
municipality is "a creature of the State. " 7 It is created by charter
granted by the state legislature, and its power is derived from and
dependent upon the sovereign power of the state. 8 Although the
municipality exercises sovereign power, that power is delegated to
it by the state, and may be withdrawn at will. 9
The tenth amendment protects the sovereign power of the state,
including its control over its municipal corporations, from usurpation by the federal government. 10 Although the power to enact
bankruptcy laws is an enumerated federal power under article I,
section 8 of the Constitution, 11· the tenth amendment may limit
Congress in the enactment of federal legislation dealing with
municipal bankruptcies. At issue is the extent to which a federal
bankruptcy court may permissibly direct or control the affairs of a
municipality without infringing upon the sovereign power of the
State.
In enacting the original Chapter IX in 1934, 12 Congress merely
provided a procedure by which a local governmental unit could
voluntarily enter the bankruptcy court with a plan of readjustment.
If it could obtain acceptances from two-thirds of its creditors, the
petitioning governmental unit could get a readjustment plan confirmed by the court and have it enforced against nonconsenting

I E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 4;J 3.02 (3d ed. 1971).
Id.
9 Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 529 (1936).
10 The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The exercise of a power not granted to the Congress
by the Constitution (e.g., education) may be exercised by the state. Congress cannot take
these sovereign powers from the state. See I E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ,i
1.45 (3d ed. 1971). A state may, however, consent to federal interference with its sovereign
powers. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 52 (1938).
11 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, says, "The Congress shall have Power to .... establish uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States .... "
12 Act of May 24, 1934, ch, 345, 48 Stat. 798.
7

8
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creditors. 13 Significantly, Chapter IX also provided that the state
could require its approval or consent to the proceedings. 14
In Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No.
One, 15 the Supreme Court held that this original enactment of
Chapter IX, as applied to a water district, violated the tenth
amendment by impairing the sovereign power of the state, since
implementation of Chapter IX procedures "might materially restrict" the water district's control over its fiscal affairs. 16 Chapter
IX was sufficiently related to the topic of bankruptcies to be within
the scope of Congress' enumerated bankruptcy power. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that Chapter IX constituted a threat to
the "independence of the States" 17 in violation of the tenth
amendment. In order to preserve the independence of the states,
"the means and instrumentalities employed for carrying on the
operations of their governments, for preserving their existence,
... should be left free and unimpaired." 18 The Court found the
consent of the state to a Chapter IX proceeding to be insufficient to
preserve its sovereignty and to validate the constitutionality of
Chapter IX. Relying upon United States v. Butler, 19 the Court
reasoned that the powers of Congress could not be enlarged by the
consent of the states to such an extent, since Congress could only
exercise powers which were expressly granted to it. 2 ° Further-

13
Id. The petition had to be accompanied by a plan of readjustment that had been
accepted by creditors holding not less than 51 percent in amount of its outstanding obligations (30 percent in the case of drainage, irrigation, reclamation, and levee districts). After
the plan had been approved by the judge, it was to be submitted to the creditors for their
acceptance. It could not be confirmed until it had been accepted by creditors holding
two-thirds in amount of the claims against it. Although it is unclear exactly how or when the
requirement applied, the statute appears to have included an additional requirement of
acceptance by 75 percent in amount of the claims of all creditors. Id. 48 Stat. 801. Because of
the statute's brief period of existence, there does not appear to have been any discussion of
when these two standards were applicable. This 75 percent requirement was absent from the
statute's language when it was re-enacted in 1937. See Act of August 16, 1937, ch. 657, §
83(d), 50 Stat. 657. The 1934 statute contained a "cram-down" provision which eliminated
the need for the vote of any creditor or class of creditors if its claims were not affected by the
plan or if the plan made provision for protection or payment of their claims. Once a plan had
been confirmed, it was binding upon the municipality and all of its creditors. Act of May 24,
1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798. See generally Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement
Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 524-26 (1936).
14
Act of May 24, I934, ch. 345, § 80(k), 48 Stat. 802. The statute contemplated the filing of
a petition against a municipality only by its creditors. See id .. § 80(a), 48 Stat. 798.
15
298 U.S. 513 (1936).
16
Id. at 530.
i1 Id.
18
Id. at 528. The Court relied heavily upon the analogy to the tax-exempt status which the
water district's bonds enjoyed, and inferred that this status reflected the constitutional
limitation against interference in a state's fiscal affairs. The majority perceived a similar
limitation upon Chapter IX and. therefore, found it to be unconstitutional in its entirety. Id.
at 528-30.
19
297 U.S. I (1936).
20
298 U.S. at 53 I.
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more, the Court, citing United States v. Constantine,2 1 held that
state sovereignty could not be surrendered by consent or legislation. 22
In dissent, Justice Cardozo argued that the statutory consent
provision required that Chapter IX be sustained as a constitutional
exercise of the bankruptcy power. 23 He analogized the bankruptcy
power to the taxing power, citing authority to the effect that a state
may consent to taxation by the federal government. 24 Thus, while
the majority relied upon the analogy to the taxing power to declare
Chapter IX unconstitutional, 25 Cardozo concluded that this analogy compelled the opposite result.
After the Ashton decision Congress enacted a second Chapter IX
which was virtually identical to its predecessor. 26 In United States
v. Bekins, 27 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
second Chapter IX, distinguishing Ashton on the grounds that the
new Chapter IX was "carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon
the sovereignty of the State." 28 In particular, the Court referred to
the section of the act expressly prohibiting restrictions on the
power of the state to control the debtor municipality. 29 The Court
21

296 U.S. 287 (1935).
298 U.S. at 531. Neither of the· precedents cited by the Court compelled the result
reached in Ashton, since both dealt with taxes which the Court held to be beyond the power
of Congress to impose. Butler dealt with a tax levied upon the processors of farm products
which the Court held to be a regulation of agricultural production beyond the power given by
the taxing clause. Constantine held that the acquiescence of the state could not enlarge the
power of Congress in order to allow it to levy an excise tax solely on liquor dealers who
violated state liquor taxes. in Ashton the question was not one of power, since the Court had
already acknowledged that Congress' bankruptcy power extended to such a setting. Rather
the issue involved a blending of the legitimate interests of the state and federal governments.
Butler can be further distinguished in that it involved the consent of an individual as opposed
to that of a sovereign.
23
298 U.S. at 541 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
24
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
25
See note 18 supra.
26
Act of August 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653. In this act counties were omitted
from the class of petitioners eligible for relief. (They were again added to the Act in 1940.
Act of June 28, 1940, Pub. L. No. 669, 54 Stat. 667 .) The draftsmen of the 1937 Act believed
that counties were more necessary arms of state government and hence possessed a greater
degree of sovereignty than improvement districts or cities. This omission was viewed as the
crucial distinction between the new Chapter IX and the old one. Proposed Amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act: Hearings on H.R. 2505 Before the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and
Reorganization of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 31, 51-52
(1937).
The former act provided for a "Plan of Adjustment," while the new act provided for a
''Plan of Composition." Instead of requiring consent on the part of an agency of the state,
the new act required that "the petitioner is authorized by law to take all action necessary
... to carry out the plan." Act of August 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 302, § 83(e)(6), 50 Stat. 658.
See generally Patterson, Municipal Debt Adjustme(lfs Under the Bankruptcy Act, 90 U. PA.
L. REV. 520, 526-30 (1942). In substance, the new act, like its predecessor, was confined to
measures essential for the proposal, acceptance and confirmation of a plan of composition
binding upon all creditors affected by the plan. 5 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY~ 81 .27 (4th ed.
1975).
27
304 U.S. 27 (1938).
28
/d. at 51.
29 Id.
22
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further emphasized that the act expressly prohibited bankruptcy
court interference with the debtor municipality's political or governmental powers, property, or revenues essential for governmental purposes, and income-producing property. 30 Unlike Ashton,
Bekins suggested that the tenth amendment permitted the states to
consent to federal interference in their affairs. 31 Moreover, the
Bekins Court adopted the analogy between the taxing power and
the bankruptcy power which Cardozo had advanced in his Ashton
dissent. Thus, the Court concluded that the provision for state
consent to a Chapter IX proceeding invited "the intervention of the
bankruptcy power" in order to save a municipal corporation which
the state was "powerless to rescue." 32
Since Bekins, Chapter IX has served as the basic framework for
municipal bankruptcy legislation. In 1976 it was revised in response to the fiscal crisis facing New York City. 33 This revision
eliminated the requirement that the petition be accompanied by the
written consent of 51 percent of the municipality's creditors, a
restriction which had effectively precluded many major
municipalities from relief under Chapter IX. 34 The revision also
made available to the petitioner, pursuant to court approval,
specific powers to be used in reordering the financial affairs of the
municipality. 35 It is expected that more extensive changes may be

Id.
Id. at 52.
32 Id. at 54. As other commentators have observed, it is difficult to reconcile Ashton and
Bekins on any meaningful grounds because the two acts are so similar. See, e.g., Note.
Reform of Creditor Participation Procedures in Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J. 423,
436 n.80 (1976). It is arguable that these two decisions simply illustrate the shift in the
Court's view of the scope of federal power that occurred at that time. Compare. e.g .. Carter
v. Carter Coal Co .. 298 U.S. 238 ( 1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936); Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U .S 548 (1937);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937). For a discussion of these and
other such cases. see Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy. 1933-1946,
pts. I & 2, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 883 (1946).
33
Bankruptcy Act. ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (to be codified as 11 U .S.C. §§
401-418 (1976)).
34
The identity of many creditors who hold bearer bonds is unascertainable. Klein. The
New Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act. PRAC. LAW., June I, 1976. at 76. Instead of the
written consent requirement. the municipality must satisfy one of four less stringenl requirements. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9. Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 84, 90 Stat. 3 I 7 (to be codified as
II U.S.C. § 404 (1976)).
35
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260. §§ 82(b), 85(g), 85(h), 90 Stat. 316. 317 (to
be codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), 405(g). 405(h) (1976)). The powers which are available to
the petitioner in proceedings under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act are: (I) the power
to reject executory contracts and unexpired leases; (2) the power to issue first priority
certificates of indebtedness; (3) the power to avoid fraudulent transfers; and (4) the power to
set aside voidable preferences. Klein, supra note 34, at 77. For a summary of the provisions
of the new statute. see King. Municipal Insolvency: Chapter IX, Old ai1d New: Chapter IX
Rules, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55 (1976).
30
31
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made in 1977 or 1978, as Congress considers a comprehensive
revision of the entire Bankruptcy Act. 36

II. FUTURE FINANCIAL STABILITY CANNOT BE
ASSURED BY A COMPOSITION ALONE

For a financially embarrassed municipality relief under the
Bankruptcy Act is a remedy of last resort. 37 The filing of a Chapter
IX petition has a drastic impact on the availability of short term
credit and on the market demand for municipal bonds, thus militating against the filing of frivolous petitions. 38 A Chapter IX proceeding is warranted only where efforts to resolve the crisis outside the
bankruptcy process have already failed.
' act, as amended, and under the bills pending
Under the current
in the Congress, the role of the bankruptcy court is limited to the
confirmation or disapproval of a composition plan submitted by the
municipality. 39 Chapter IX provides for a simple composition of
debt without any other supervision by the bankruptcy court. 40
Interference in the fiscal affairs of a Chapter IX petitioner is essential to the success of a Chapter IX proceeding. However, Chapter
IX proceedings are expressly designed to preclude .the independent
management or control of fiscal policy which is often necessary to
facilitate the restructuring of the finances of an embarrassed municipality. 41 Thus, the court is often unable to prevent future defaults

3 •·1n 1973, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States made its report
proposing a new bankruptcy statute. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. II
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Bankruptcy Act]. This bill represents a major reworking of the structure of the present bankruptcy legislation.
In 1977, a bill was introduced into the Congress which adopted many of the suggested
changes of the Commission, but retained much of the present statute's structure. H.R. 6,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Bill].
The revised Chapter IX, which will be relabeled as Chapter VIII by the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act, relies largely upon the present statute. The arguments presented here apply
with equal force to this new legislation. Where there are pertinent differences they will be
noted.
37
Financial Emergencies, supra note I, at 85.
38
Id. at 84.
39 Section 82(c) of Chapter IX, (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1976)), prevents the
court from interfering with a petitioner's: (a) political or governmental powers; (b) property
or revenues necessary for essential governmental purposes; or (c) any of the petitioner's
income-producing property, unless the plan so provides. The purpose of section 83(c) is to
restrict the power of the bankruptcy judge to mere approval or disapproval of a proposed
plan.
4
° Financial Emergencies, supra note I, at 85.
41
Dession, Municipal Debt Adjustment and the Supreme Court, 46. YALE L.J. 199, 216
(1936).
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and bankruptcy petitions because it is powerless to remedy inept
fiscal management by a municipality's elected officials. 42
Inasmuch as debt adjustment without court supervision is not
permitted under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, Chapter IX
is an anomaly. 43 Allowing a petitioner to avail itself of the benefits
of a composition proceeding while remaining in complete control of
its affairs is contrary to the traditions and the fundamental sense of
equity which theoretically permeate the bankruptcy proceeding. 44
The confirmation of a composition plan in these circumstances
might be viewed as an abuse of the court's jurisdiction, because the
mismanaged municipality receives not only judicial protection
from suits by its creditors, 45 but also a partial discharge from its
debts. 46 In effect, the court binds nonconsenting creditors to a plan
formulated by a debtor which cannot be compelled to rid itself of
financial mismanagement. 47 Unfairness is inherent in such a situation, and remedial inadequacy is practically assured. 48
Moreover, a compositon without meaningful supervision is unfair to holders of certificates of indebtedness issued by the court as

· 42 The limited power of th·e bankruptcy court is illustrated by the case of one Texas
municipality which has undergone four Chapter IX proceedings since the early l930's. The
courts have been unable "to force a changing cast of elected officials to comply with
voluntarily accepted settlements of the past." Financial Emergencies, s11pra note I, at 85.
43
For example, Chapter X provides for the appointment of an independent trustee to
operate the business under the close supervision of the court. 11 U .S.C. §§ 586-591 (1970).
Chapter XI contemplates continued operation of the business by the debtor, 11 U .S.C. §
743. However, upon initiating a Chapter XI proceeding, the debtor becomes a "debtor in
possession" and his power over the.business is markedly changed due to the control of the
court. See generally 8 W. COLLIER, si1pra note 4, ,i,i 6.30-6.32.
44
See American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 146
(1940); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939); Local Loan .Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
240 (1934); Bankruptcy Act§ 2(a), 11 U .S.C. § I !(a) (1970). See also Glenn, Essentials of
Bankr11ptcy: Prevention of Fra11d, and Control of Debtor, 23 VA. L. REv. 373 (1937).
45
Bankruptcy Act,. ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(c), 90 Stat. 318 (to be codified as 11
U .S.C. §. 405(e) (1976) ), sets up an .automatic stay on suits by creditors at the filing of a
Chapter IX petition. See also Proposed Bankruptcy Act, supra note 36, §§ 4-501, 8-101;
House Bill, s11pra note 36, § 944.
46
See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 95(b), 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as
11 U .S.C. § 4l5(b) (1976) ). See also Proposed Bankruptcy Act, s11pra note 36, § 8-308(b);
House Bill, s11pra note 36, § 944.
47
See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 95(a), 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as 11
U .S.C. § 415 (a) (1976) ). In addition to this power to bind nonconsenting creditors, the 1976
amendments to Chapter IX grant additional powers to be used by the municipality in
reorganizing its financial affairs. See note 35 s11pra.
48
In a straight bankruptcy proceeding involving an individual, the debtor receives a
discharge from his dischargeable debts, but he is also forced to liquidate his nonexempt
property for the benefit of his creditors. A municipality cannot be forced to liquidate its
property in this manner, but since it may reduce ifs debts even as to nonconsenting
creditors, equity should require local officials to implement sound financial measures as a
quid pro quo for the discharge of indebtedness. Under current Chapter IX, however, a
municipality cannot be compelled to reform its unsound financial policies. See notes 39-42
and accompanying text supra.
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part of the bankruptcy proceedings 49 and to those future creditors
of the municipality who thereafter extend credit to the municipality
only to see it founder again in future years. Any future creditor can
be said to have relied solely upon his own perception of the municipality's fiscal stability in extending credit. However, when a bankruptcy court approves the issuance of certificates of indebtedness,
it is possible that some takers will perceive this approval as a
determination by the court that the municipality will be financially
rehabilitated and will be able to repay these certificates when no
such determination has been made.
The court is not completely without weapons in combating these
inequities. Under the present Chapter IX "feasibility" is a condition for confirmation of a plan. 50 If the bankruptcy judge finds that
the petitioner's plan is not feasible, he can refuse to confirm it. This
prevents enforcement of the plan against nonconsenting creditors
and prevents the discharge of dischargeable claims. 51 However,
the feasibility requirement is not an effective solution to Chapter
IX problems for three reasons. The feasibility condition is only
intended to ensure that the petitioner will have adequate tax revenues to make required payments to creditors under the plan. 52
Accordingly, the prospects of future default and the chances of
financial rehabilitation are not required to be considered. Second,
it is arguable that a bankruptcy court's nonconfirmation ofa municipality's plan, because of the failure of local officials to develop a
sound fiscal policy, would constitute interference with the municipality's political or governmental functions. Such an interference is
expressly prohibited by the act. 53 Finally, public policy considerations compel an expedited proceeding. Citizens who are dependent
upon the petitioner's services should not be subjected to extended
periods of uncertainty while the court bargains with city officials in
an effort to develop an acceptable plan.
49 The power to issue first priority certification of indebtedness was among those given to
a petitioner by the 1976 amendments. See note 35 supra. The Commission's proposed
revision of this chapter does not explicitly provide for certificates of indebtedness, although
the House Bill does. See House Bill, supra note 36, §§ 364, 901.
50 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 94(b)(I ), 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as 11
U.S.C. § 414 (b)(I) (1976)). In the context of Chapter XI proceedings this term has been
construed to mean merely that the provisions of the plan will actually be performed. 9 W.
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ,r 9.18[1] (4th ed. 1976). "The test is whether the things which are to
be done after confirmation can be done as a practical matter under the facts." Id.
51 See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 95, 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as 11
U .S.C. § 415 ( 1976) ). The Bankruptcy Act expressly provides that no state law prescribing a
method of composition can be binding on any creditor without his consent. Bankruptcy Act,
ch. 9. Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 83, 90 Stat. 316 (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. § 403) (1976)).
52 H. R. REP. No. 94-686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976). See also note 50 and accompanying text supra.
53 See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(c), 90Stat.316 (to be codified as 11
U.S.C. § 402(c) (1976)).
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In short, to prohibit additiorial judicial control over the municipality's fiscal affairs is "to forbid a restructuring of the City's fiscal
system which may be essential to any successful plan of debt
adjustment. " 54 Even without malfeasance or incompetent fiscal
management, municipal policymakers may be politically reluctant
to take the drastic steps necessary to solve the city's financial
problems. In contrast, an independent federal court can assume
responsibility for the required restructuring. 55 To undertake this
role the bankruptcy court must have more control over the debtor's fiscal affairs, provided that control is consistent with constitutional limitations.

III. THE MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY POWER
AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT

The power to establish laws on the subject of bankruptcy is one
of the enumerated powers of the federal government granted by the
Constitution. 56 The enumerated powers are regarded as plenary in
nature. 57 Accordingly, where a subject is properly within the scope
of an enumerated power, Congress can legislate preemptively, thus
effectively depriving states of power to deal with the same subject. 58 In the area of bankruptcy legislation, federal preemption is
well established. 59 Thus the congressional power over bankruptcy
is plenary in nature and may, in the discretion of Congress, be
extended to all types of debtors. 60
The scope of an enumerated power, however, may be limited by
other provisions of the Constitution. With respect to congressional
legislation affecting municipal bankruptcies the tenth amendment

54
Hearings on S. 2597 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17·
(1975) (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman).
55
Financial Emergencies, supra note I, at 85.
56
See note 11 supra.
57
See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929). See also Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (involving the commerce power); Board of
Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (involving the foreign
commerce power).
·
58 See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), involving the
Atomic Energy Commission's preemption of state regulation of nuclear power plants.
59 In International Shoe Cci. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929), which held that the
Bankruptcy Act superseded an inconsistent state insolvency law, the Court declared that the
"power of Congress to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies ... is unrestricted and paramount."
60 Note, The Constitutionality of the Municipal Debt Readjustment Act, 35 CoLUM. L.
REV. 428, 431 (1935).
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constitutes a possible limitation. 61 The tenth amendment has traditionally not been viewed as imposing a limitation upon the exercise
of the enumerated powers. 62 Rather, the Supreme Court has observed that the tenth amendment "states but a truism that all is
retained [by the states] which has not been surrendered. " 63
The purpose of the tenth amendment, however, is the preservation of the bifurcation of sovereign power between centralized
government and the several states. 64 Thus, in Fry v. United
States, 65 the Court, upholding the constitutionality of the wage
freeze of the Economic Stabilization Act of 197066 on the basis of
the commerce clause, stated that the tenth amendment requires
Congress to respect the integrity of the states and their place in the
federal system. 67 National League of Cities v. Usery 68 reiterated
the Fry conception of the tenth amendment. 69 National League of
Cities held that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, which extended minimum wage and overtime pay provisions
to local government employees, were not within the authority
granted to the Congress by the commerce clause. 70 The Court
stated that the FLSA amendments operated ''to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions. " 71 Accordingly, this exercise
of congressional authority was held not to comport with the federal
system embodied in the Constitution, 72 since it would impair the
ability of states to function effectively in a federal system. 73
The Court distinguished Fry, which upheld the application of the
1970 wage freeze to employees of the state. 74 First, the Court noted
61

See note IO supra.
In Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945), the Court averred that "[t]he Tenth
Amendment does not operate as a limitation upon the powers, express or implied, delegated
to the national government." This case upheld under the commerce clause the enforcement
of national labor standards against a manufacturer of goods who shipped in interstate
commerce.
.
63
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). The Court additionally noted:
There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than
declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had
been established before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay
fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted
and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
Id.
64
See Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 575 (1931).
65 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
66
Act of August 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799.
67
421 U.S. at 547 n. 7. "The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system." Id.
68
96 S.Ct. 2465 (1976).
69
Id. at 2470.
70 Id. at 2474.
11 Id.
12 Id.
1a 1d.
14
Id. at 2474-75.
62
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that the Economic Stabilization Act dealt with a serious problem
that could be solved only by federal action. Furthermore, the
statutory provisions at issue in Fry were drafted so that federalinterference with the states' freedom was for a very limited period
of time. Third, the congressional enactment in Fry neither displaced the states' choices as to the structure of governmental
operations, nor did it force the states to reassess choices already
made. Finally, the act considered in Fry operated to reduce pres,
sures on state budgets rather than to increase them.
Chapter IX, like the statute challen$ed in Fry, deals with a
serious problem for which only the national government can supply
a remedy. A Chapter IX proceeding infringes upon the states'
power in only a limited way and for only a limited period of time.
Additionally, Chapter IX is carefully drafted to preserve the freedom of the state in the ultimate decisions regarding the structure of
municipal operations. 75 Finally, Chapter IX operates to relieve
state fiscal pressures, not to increase them. In short, Chapter IX
affects· the states' power over their political subdivisions only in an
incidental manner. 76
Additionally, a~ expanded Chapter IX would be consistent with
the limitations of the tenth amendment since the state retains the
power to prevent a municipal corporation from filing a Chapter IX
petition. 77 Chapter IX recognizes that the state must grant to the
municipality the power to -avail itself of a debt readjustment pro-

75

See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
Arguably, however, the proposed expansions of Chapter IX powers, see Part IV infra,
might violate the tenth amendment limitation on the exercise of federal power over the states
recognized in National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). In National League
the Court stated that "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits
it from exercising the authority in that manner," 96 S.Ct. at 2471 (emphasis added). In
determining whether the proposed expansion of Chapter IX powers would exceed the tenth
amendment limit, the crucial issue is whether the increased control of the bankruptcy court
over the municipal debtor is a usurpation of "functions essential to separate and independent existence" of the states. Id. Arguably, control by the bankruptcy court over the fiscal
problems of a municipal debtor would displace "state policies" as to the manner in which
"the States and their political subdivisions ... will structure delivery of those governmental
services which their citizens requin:." Id. at 2472. With respect to its impact upon "traditional aspects of state sovereignty," the proposed expansion of Chapter IX powers might be
analogized to the 1974 FLSA Amendments voided in National League, rather than to the
1970 Economic Stabilization Act upheld in Fry. However, such an application of the
National League rationale to the proposed expansion of Chapter IX powers insufficiently
considers the federal interest in protecting the creditors of the municipal debtor and rehabilitating the municipal debtor. Therefore, until the scope of the National League
rationale is further delineated by the Court, such an expansive interpretation of the tenth
amendment should be eschewed as inconsistent with the "balancing approach" advanced
by Mr. Justice Blackmun in his National League concurrence.
17
See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
76
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ceeding before it can file a petition. 78 Moreover, no involuntary
petitions are allowed to be filed against the municipality. 79 A bankruptcy court, therefore, cannot assertjurisdiction over a municipality if a state prohibits the petitioner from filing a voluntary petition.
By granting a city the power to file a Chapter IX petition, the state
should be deemed to have consented to federal intervention in the
fiscal affairs of the debtor municipality .80
In order to ensure financial stability, the federal bankruptcy
court must have the power to interfere in the fiscal affairs of a
petitioning municipality. 81 Judicial control of the finances of the
petitioner would not constitute interference with the delegation of
powers provided for by state law. A judicially supervised financial
reorganization of a municipality would not impair the integrity of
the state or its ability to function in a federal system. 82 In addition
to the fact that the court acts with the consent of the state, there is
no reason why the plan of reorganization need interfere in the
political or electoral processes of the city. 83 The tenth amendment
should impose no limitation upon the exercise of the bankruptcy
power with respect to municipal debtors beyond the preservation
of state power over local government and the prevention of interference with local political or elective processes. 84 Thus, the ex-

78

See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(a), 90 Stat. 317 (to be codified as 11
U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976)).
80
In order to satisfy the tenth amendment, Chapter IX preserves the power of the state to
delegate governmental power. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 83, 90 Stat. 316
(to be codified as II U.S.C. § 403 (1976)). See note 6 supra. Concomitant with the
preservation of state power, the municipality's political processes must be protected from
federal interference under Chapter IX. Thus, a federal bankruptcy court cannot become
involved in the local election process, even though the election jeopardizes the plan of
composition or adjustment. Spellings v. Dewey, 122 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1941). Furthermore,
the court in a Chapter IX proceeding must respect the delegation of any municipal powers to
other state agencies. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,575 (1964), holding that the
state has absolute discretion respecting the scope of a municipality's powers. See also I E.
MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 'ii 3.02 (3d ed. 1971).
81
See generally Part II supra.
82
See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
83
See note 80 supra.
84
In his Ashton dissent, Mr. Justice Cardozo noted that the history of bankruptcy reveals
that the concept of bankruptcy power is an expanding one. 298 U.S. at 535. Broader judicial
control over a municipal debtor should be viewed as simply another stage in the development of the bankruptcy clause.
The argument presented in this section assumes that Chapter IX as presently written is
constitutional. In view of the decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465
(1976), it is possible, however, that Chapter IX will come under constitutional attack. This
issue is raised and discussed in Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the
New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1871 (1976).
The note suggests that in view of the state government's role in a federal system, one of
decentralizing governmental power and of serving as a "laboratory" for experimentation
and change, it is the state's "autonomy interests," i.e., "the state's role as an independent
legal and political entity." which must be protected to ensure that congressional legislation
will be constitutionally upheld. Id. at 1886-87. Clearly the state's lawmaking functions must
79
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pansion of judicial- control in a Chapter IX proceeding over the
financial reorganization of a local municipality herein suggested
should not be precluded.

IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

The Supreme Court has succinctly stated the goals of a bankruptcy proceeding, indicating that "[l]iquidation is not the objecbe protected, but in other areas the distinction between protected and unprotected interests
is much less evident.
When one moves from such basic elements of statehood to the functions of the
states in collecting revenues and providing services, however, clear facial identification of autonomy interests are no longer possible. Certainly, the state must be
free to collect some revenue to support its continued existence and to provide basic
governmental services. In the economic context, however, the state necessarily
functions in a complex environment of interacting state and national policies, and
the basic purposes of federalism do not require the complete isolation of the state
as an economic actor. Congressional legislation affecting this environment, however, may in some cases so constrict the structural or fiscal operations of the state
as to threaten the state's ability to enact and enforce its laws, maintain its governmental structure, or provide critical and necessarily public services.
Id. at 1887.
The note proposes that any statute which infringes upon state autonomy interests must
satisfy two tests in order to be constitutional. Id. at 1888-91. First, the procedure utilized
must allow state interests to be fully considered. The suggestion is made by the author that
the present Chapter IX effectively allows state concerns to be raised because only tl,e
municipality may initiate a proceeding, and because the plan of adjustment is formulated and
submitted to the court by the municipality. The second requirement is that the federal
legislation must ensure substantive protection of the state's autonomy interests utilizing a
test much like the "least restrictive alternative" test used in other constitutional areas.
So long as adequate process is provided and the accomodation requirement is
met - in other words, so long as the interests of the states have been considered
and represented as fully as possible in the federal forum - then the purposes of
judicial scrutiny have been fulfilled and the federal legislation should be considered
constitutional, regardless of its implications for state autonomy.
Id. at 1890.
Although Chapter IX definitely represents an intrusion upon some of the state's autonomy
interests, the author of the note concludes that it satisfies the constitutional test which he
has suggested. This conclusion relies heavily upon the prohibitions contained in Bankruptcy
Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(c), 90 Stat. 316 (to be codified as 11 U .S.C. § 402(c)
(1976) ), and the ability of the municipality to formulate the plan of adjustment to be used,
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 84, 90 Stat. 317 (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. §
404 (1976) ). Even in the absence of these two provisions, however, Chapter IX should be
upheld as constitutional.
State "autonomy interests" are ultimately protected because Chapter IX does not allow
the filing of an involuntary-petition against the municipality. The municipality has the initial
choice of preventing any federal interference in its fiscal affairs and the bankruptcy court
cannot interfere until the municipality has decided to seek the relief which bankruptcy
proceedings offer. Even if the court is given more control in the formulation of the plan, the
state's interests are additionally protected in that the municipality will be heard and will be
allowed to make objections and suggestions to the court before any plan of adjustment is
confirmed.
The role of the bankruptcy judge is also very important in balandng the competing federal
and state interests involved in a municipal bankruptcy proceeding. See Note, 89 HARV. L.
REV., supra at 1905. His consideration of the issues should continue to accord the greater
deference and respect to state interests which are more important here than in a proceeding
involving a private individual. This role would not be diminished by any of the proposals set
forth in this article. See Part IV infra.
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tive" of the reorganization proceeding, but "[r]ather, the aim is by
financial restructuring to put back into operation a going concern. " 85 If the liquidation of a municipality were a valid objective
of a Chapter XI proceeding, then a mere composition would be
sufficient to ensure a fair and equitable distribution to creditors.
The bankruptcy court in a Chapter IX proceeding, of course,
cannot liquidate a municipality. Nevertheless, it should ensure that
the proceedings result in rehabilitating the fiscal structure of the
municipality. Proposals to make a Chapter IX proceeding more
effective should emphasize two goals: (I) a fair and equitable
distribution to the city's creditors; and (2) the rehabilitation of the
municipal corporation into a viable operating entity.
A.

Elimination of the Section 82(c) Prohibitions

The three prohibitions of section 82(c) 86 must be removed from
the Act if the court is to do more than merely approve the
petitioner's plan of composition. These prohibitions are not essential for a municipal debt proceeding to satisfy the requiremens of
the tenth amendment. 87 The retention of these provisions precludes the judicial control over the debtor which is required for the
success of the proceeding. Even without other statutory changes,
the removal of these prohibitions will significantly increase the
court's power over the debtor. 88
The bankruptcy legislation which has been proposed by the
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws does not contain a provision
similar to section 82(c). 89 Since no explanation for the deletion is
offered in the accompanying commentaries, 90 it may be assumed
that no major policy shift was envisioned. Bankruptcy courts have
traditionally possessed inherently broad equitable powers which
do not depend upon express statutory provisions. 91 Thus, without85

Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417" U.S. 467. 470 (1974). Baker dealt with the
reorganization of a railroad, a process raising issues of public policy similar to those
presented by the Chapter IX petitioner, since the services involved are essential to the
public. Therefore, the goal of such a reorganization proceeding serves as an appropriate
model for an expanded Chapter IX proceeding in which the finances of the municipality are
similarly adjusted.
86
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(c), 90 Stat. 316 (to be codified as 11
U.S.C. § 402(c) (1976)). See note 39 supra.
87
See Part III supra.
88
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(b)(3), 90 Stat. 316 (to be codified as 11
U .S.C. § 402(b)(3) (1976) ), provides that" ... the court may ... exercise such other powers
as are not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter."
89
See Proposed Bankruptcy Act, supra note 36, Ch. VIII. But see House Bill, supra note
36, § 904.
90
See COMMUNICATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., !st Sess., Pts. I
& II (1973).
91
American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 146 (1940).

FALL

1976]

Municipal Bankruptcy-Chapter IX

105

the prohibitions of section 82(c), bankruptcy courts will be free to
exercise their powers more extensively, provided they act within
the limits of section 83(c) and the tenth amendment. Nevertheless,
in order to ensure this result, Congress should enact statutory
provisions consistent with the proposals advanced in this article.

B.

Judicial Control of Finances and Budgets

Supervision of a debtor's financial affairs is the sine qua non of
successful financial rehabilitation. As a general rule the parties, not
the courts, formulate the plans of adjustment under the various
chapters of the Bankruptcy Act. 92 For a variety of administrative
and constitutional reasons, the bankruptcy judge is not the proper
authority to make the ultimate decisions regarding municipal programs. 93 Nevertheless, in a Chapter IX proceeding, the court
should be empowered to make certain determinations which would
provide a framework for subsequent decisions by local officials.
There are several ways in which the bankruptcy court can make
important contributions without undermining the responsibility of
public officials to determine the level of public services to be
provided. For example, the valuation of anticipated revenues is
essential to the formulation of any successful plan, just as determining "reorganization value" is critical in corporate reorganizations. 94 The court should require that the municipality use accurate
accounting methods in order to ensure that a realistic determination of anticipated annual revenue is utilized in formulati~g the

See Ii U .S.C. §§ 569, 570, 723 (1970).
See notes 100 & IOI and accompanying text infra.
94 Reorganization value is determined by the court in a reorganization proceeding to
ensure that the plan meets the requirements for confirmation. 6A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ,i 11.05 (4th ed. 1976). This value is used in determining whether an entity is solvent
or insolvent, which classes of creditors will be allowed to participate in the reorganization,
and whether a rehabilitation is possible or liquidation is the only reasonable alternative. Id.
The determination of this value is based upon a reasonably informed judgment of the earning
capacity of the business as a going concern followed by a capitalization of these projected
earnings. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 525-26 (1941).
Reorganization value is not, however, used merely to assure that the respective priorities
of creditors are upheld. "A basic requirement of any reorganization is the determination of a
capitalization which makes it possible not only to respect the priorities of the various classes
of claimants but also to give the new company a reasonable prospect for survival." Group of
Inst. Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P., & Pac. R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 540 (1943).
Although a bankruptcy court cannot force a municipality into liquidation proceedings, it
must still respect the relative priorities of each class of creditors in a municipal debt
adjustment proceeding. See note 106 and accompanying text infra. An accurate valuation of
the city's anticipated revenues is also necessary for the court to determine whether the plan
provides ·the city with a financial structure which will lead to future fiscal stability.
92

93
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plan. Such judicial supervision will discourage the debtor municipality from engaging in short term borrowing based upon an inflated estimate of anticipated revenues. 95
Nonetheless, short term borrowing may be a useful tool in the
administration of municipal finances, since the need for cash often
arises before anticipated revenues are realized. 96 To a financially
struggling municipality, these cash flow problems can be critical.
Accordingly, Chapter IX empowers the court to permit the issuance of certificates of indebtedness, thereby allowing the
petitioner to raise cash before it realizes its anticipated revenues. 97
It follows that the court should have sufficient authority to ensure
that realized revenues are actually applied to the outstanding short
term debt. 98
Since the court is currently prohibited from interference with
"any of the property or revenues of the petitioner," 99 it is difficult
to prevent a municipality from issuing certificates of indebtedness
beyond the amount of its yearly income. In addition, the court is
powerless to prevent a city from borrowing from other sources,
even when such borrowing jeopardizes the composition plan. The
court should be granted the authority to prevent irresponsible
borrowing, and Chapter IX should be revised to facilitate such an
objective.
The power to determine anticipated annual revenues, coupled
with the power to oversee borrowing, enables the court to delineate the parameters of the municipality's budget. However, the
use of such powers should not permit judicial direction of the
manner in which revenues are spent in the delivery of municipal
goods and services. 100 This latter type of control might realistically
be viewed as a form of interference with state sovereignty which
the tenth amendment forbids. 101 However, the power to determine
fiscal parameters could .ensure that the municipality presents to the

95 Borrowing on the basis of an inflated estimate of anticipated revenues is not an
uncommon municipal practice. It is also a major cause of financial collapse. Financial
Emergencies, supra note I, at 62.
96 Id.
97 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(b)(2), 90 Stat. 316 (to be codified as 11
U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (1976)).
98 This overseer capacity would entail retention of jurisdiction by the court after confirmation. See Bankroptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 96(e), 90 Stat. 325 (to be codified as
11 U .S.C. § 416(e) (1976)).
99 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(c)(2), 90Stat.316 (to be codified as 11
U.S.C. § 402(c)(2) (1976)).
100 The only exception to this limitation would be the court's capacity to ensure that
certificates of indebtedness are repaid. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
101
See note 76 supra.
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court a balanced budget based upon realistic estimates of available
resources. 102

C.

The Financial Rehabilitation

In order for a plan of composition to be confirmed, the present
Bankruptcy Act requires that a plan be "feasible" and "fair and
equitable." 103 Feasibility is simply intended to mean that the
debtor can satisfy the plan's requirements with respect to the
repayment of creditors. 104 Application of this standard requires a
judicial determination that the creditors will actually receive what
the plan offers them. 105 The feasibility test is inadequate because it
does not ensure financial rehabilitation, which should be a principal objective of the municipal debt adjustment proceeding.
Similarly, requiring a fair and equitable plan does not compel the
court to evaluate the prospects of future fiscal improvement.
Rather, this provision embodies the rule established in early reorganization cases that the priorities of creditors be respected and
that creditors with a priority be fully paid before subordinate interests are allowed to benefit from the debt adjustment proceedings. 106 Furthermore, the fair and equitable standard in Chapter IX
requires the municipality to exercise its taxing power to the
greatest practicable extent. Finally, it ensures that the plan results
from an open bargain without any overreaching. 107

102
The minority report to the Bankruptcy Act amendments of 1976 expresses the view
that the municipal debt adjustment procedure should require that a balanced budget be
presented to the court as part of the plan:
The purpose of municipal bankruptcy is to give the municipality an opportunity
to get its house in order and make whatever adjustments or arrangements are
indicated with existing indebtedness so that it may emerge from the bankruptcy
under circumstances in which it can survive. No municipality can survive unless its
projected revenues, regardless of source, and projected expenditures, regardless of
purpose, are in balance. We do not think that Congress intends to make available
the extreme remedies of a stay of all adverse proceedings and involuntary compositions of the debts of objecting creditors and of other benefits of Chapter IX in the
absence of a clear municipal intent to balance its budget.
H.R. REP. No. 94-686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 59. reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 81 I.
103
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 94(b), 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as 11
U.S.C. § 414(b) (1976)). The proposed bankruptcy acts continue the "fair and equitable'"
standard, and although they do not expressly require that the plan be "feasible," they do
require that "all amounts to be paid by the debtor ... are reasonable." Proposed Bankruptcy
Act supra note 36, § 8-307(c); House Bill, supra note 36, § 943(3).
10
• See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra. See also H.R. REP. No. 94-686, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 811.
105
In re American Trailer Rentals Co., 325 F.2d 47, 53 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U:S. 594 (1965).
106
See, e.g., Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
101
H.R. REP. No. 94-686,.94th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& Ao. NEWS 811.
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The municipal bankruptcy statute should be amended to require
that judicial evaluation of the plan will include a determination that
future financial reorganization or rehabilitation is lik~ly to be unnecessary . 108 Judicial control over the borrowing and budgetary
limits of the municipality 109 will facilitate the evaluation of the
plan, because the control will enable the court to more accurately
predict future revenues and expenditures. Chapter IX should be
expanded to embrace this concept, because public policy favors
the financial rehabilitation of municipalities.
D.

Joinder of Overseeing State Agencies

Many states provide for the appointment of a receiver or an
agency to oversee various affairs of financially embarassed
municipalities. 110 If state law vests the power to govern municipal
finances in an independent agency, a Chapter IX proceeding will be
inadequate unless the agency is a party, since in these jurisdictions
local officials lack the power to implement the plan. 111 Therefore,
the Bankruptcy Act should permit joinder of such agencies as
necessary parties to Chapter IX proceedings. Alternatively, the
municipality's right to petition could be conditioned on the filing of
an accompanying voluntary petition by the overseeing agency.

V. CONCLUSION

Constitutional authority exists for expanded judicial control in
Chapter IX proceedings. The tenth amendment does not bar the
type of federal expansion proposed in this article. Yet Congress
has not adequately extended the powers of the federal bankruptcy
court in Chapter IX proceedings.
It must be recognized that the purpose of a Chapter IX proceeding is not merely to adjust the debt of the municipality, but also to
institute a plan which will lead to financial rehabilitation. The

10 • In Chapter VII of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, which deals with reorganizations, this
standard is incorporated as a reQuirement for confirmation: "The court shall confirm a plan
if ... the plan is feasible and not likely to be followed by the liquidation of, or a need for
further financial reorganization . . . . " Proposed Bankruptcy Act, supra note 36, § 7-103(d).
10 • See Part IV B supra.
110
Financial Emergencies, supra note I, at 77.
111 The Bankruptcy Act precludes confirmation of any plan if the petitioner is prohibited
by law from taking any of the actions required to implement it. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub.
L. No. 94-260, § 94(b)(6), 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. § 414(b)(6) (1976)). This
condition is carried over to the proposed acts. Proposed Bankruptcy Act, supra note 36, §
8-307(c)(6); House _Bill, supra note 36, § 943(5).
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Chapter IX petitioner should be required to receive relief only on
such terms. Otherwise, the claims of creditors are compromised,
and future creditors investing in a "rehabilitated" entity are likely
to be misled. If the Bankruptcy Act is to provide effective assistance to financially troubled municipalities, Congress must extend
the powers of the federal courts in dealing with municipal debtors.
-Daniel J. Goldberg

